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Abstract
This article introduces Citizenship by Investment (‘CBI’) as exceptional municipal legal mechanisms that
allow anyone to directly purchase citizenship from a selling state for a substantial monetary contribution.
States that sell citizenship assume complete control, expose, and may ultimately give up control over
citizenship. CBI simply means ‘cash for passports’ as direct, immediate naturalizations, which heightens
mobility and pre-supposes multiple citizenship, without (or with negligible) actual physical residence
requirements. CBI is marketed as ‘global citizenship’. It creates a flexible, transactional citizenship, operating
within an emerging tripartite nexus of states, citizens, and global markets for citizenship and residence
entitlements. The orthodox view is that CBI schemes exist as marginal phenomena in isolation from the rest of
citizenship, limited in personal and territorial application to the ultra-wealthy philanthropists and to small
island states. In search of ‘neo-Nottebohmian’ ‘genuine links’ beyond state sales and global market control, this
article argues that CBI laws are in fact complex agents of change, and that the concept of the genuine link has
now been transformed and is to be re-envisioned in times of globalization. CBI’s existence requires us to
rethink citizenship’s positioning within the international law community. In the laws of CBI, consideration
should be given to factors that contribute to the greater good. CBI mechanisms may become available for all,
whether wealthy or poor, as members of humanity.
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Abstract 
This article introduces Citizenship by Investment (‘CBI’) as 
exceptional municipal legal mechanisms that allow anyone to 
directly purchase citizenship from a selling state for a substantial 
monetary contribution. States that sell citizenship assume complete 
control, expose, and may ultimately give up control over citizenship. 
CBI simply means ‘cash for passports’ as direct, immediate 
naturalizations, which heightens mobility and pre-supposes 
multiple citizenship, without (or with negligible) actual physical 
residence requirements. CBI is marketed as ‘global citizenship’. It 
creates a flexible, transactional citizenship, operating within an 
emerging tripartite nexus of states, citizens, and global markets for 
citizenship and residence entitlements. The orthodox view is that 
CBI schemes exist as marginal phenomena in isolation from the rest 
of citizenship, limited in personal and territorial application to the 
ultra-wealthy philanthropists and to small island states. In search of 
‘neo-Nottebohmian’ ‘genuine links’ beyond state sales and global 
market control, this article argues that CBI laws are in fact complex 
agents of change, and that the concept of the genuine link has now 
been transformed and is to be re-envisioned in times of 
globalization. CBI’s existence requires us to rethink citizenship’s 
positioning within the international law community. In the laws of 
CBI, consideration should be given to factors that contribute to the 
greater good. CBI mechanisms may become available for all, 
whether wealthy or poor, as members of humanity.  
I  Introduction 
Citizenship demarks the legal interface that links an individual to a 
particular polity.1 Conventionally, citizenship refers to that connection’s 
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1  Today, citizenship and nationality both refer to the nation state. However, each term reflects 
a different legal framework. Citizenship is largely confined to the national dimension, whereas 
nationality refers to the international legal dimension in the context of an interstate system. 
 
 
municipal dimension, whereas nationality (a term often used 
interchangeably with citizenship), refers to the international law forum vis-
a-vis other states. 2  Citizenship appears as the more flexible concept, 
whereas nationality is more static in its reference to nationhood, identity 
and state sovereignty. 3  Subject to globalization, the legal concept of 
citizenship, then, is in a process of transition to incorporate multiple 
meanings. In a world of heightened economic, political and social 
interdependence, individual, national, and global boundaries, as well as the 
definitions of citizenship, are increasingly becoming blurred.4  
Globalization has incorporated millions of migrants into a global 
capitalist market with dimensions unprecedented in human history. 5 
Persons have joined the movements of goods, services and capital.6 The 
need for global mobility, in response to globalization, is one of the most 
pressing issues of this Century and is growing in both scope and 
complexity.7 The currently estimated 258 million migrants of the world do 
not form their own country. If they did, that country would be the fifth 
largest on earth.8  
According to Richard Bellamy, these ‘[c]urrent high levels of 
international migration [have been] sufficiently intense and prolonged and 
of such global scope as to have forced a major rethink of the criteria for 
citizenship’. 9  Similarly, Ayelet Shachar and Ran Hirschl observe that 
‘[s]tate- and market forces are becoming increasingly intertwined in 
shaping migration selection criteria [and] setting membership allocation 
                                                          
See also Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages 
(Princeton University Press, 2006) 281–2.  
2  Kim Rubenstein, ‘Globalisation and Citizenship and Nationality’ (Legal Studies Research 
Paper No 69, The University of Melbourne Faculty of Law, 2004) 4; Kim Rubenstein, 
‘Rethinking Nationality in International Humanitarian Law’ in Ustinia Dolgopol and Judith 
Gardam (eds), The Challenge of Conflict: International Law Responds (Nijhoff, 2006) 89–
104; Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 
1956) 5; Paul Magnette, Citizenship: The History Of An Idea (ECPR Press, 2005) 20–1; 
Andrew Borkowski, Roman Law (Blackstone Press, 2001)  86; R H Graveson, One Law —
On Jurisprudence and the Unification of Law, Volume II (North-Holland, 1977) 44: Saskia 
Sassen, above n 1, 281–2. 
3  Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Duke University 
Press, 1999). See also Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins 
and Spread of Nationalism (Verso, 1983) 7. 
4  Ken’ichi Omae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Global Marketplace 
(Harper Collins, 1990). 
5  Eliot Dickinson, Globalization and Migration, A World in Motion (Rowman and Littlefield, 
2017) 4–5. 
6  Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (Columbia University Press, 
1998) 77. 
7  UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN-Development Agenda, Migration and Human 
Mobility (United Nations, 2012) 3; Ronald Skeldon, Global Migration: Demographic Aspects 
and Its Relevance for Development — Technical Paper 6 (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2013). 
8  See Raquel Aldana, Won Kidane, Beth Lyon and Karla McKanders (eds), Global Issues in 
Immigration Law (West Publishing, 2013) 1; United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, The International Migration Report 2017 (Highlights) (18 December 2017) 
<https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/international-migration-report-
2017.html>. 
9  Richard Bellamy, Citizenship, A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2008) 13. 
 
 
priorities,’ creating a ‘[f]usion of market logic and national interests.’10 The 
underlying reasons for global migration are manifold and include 
humanitarian, as well as economic considerations. 11  Exposed to 
globalization, the nation state is joined by the highly mobile individual as 
well as other states operating in those markets. Nation states must therefore 
accommodate a transformation in the concept of citizenship. Since the 
advent of CBI and the creation of global markets for membership 
entitlements, nation states and citizens are no longer the exclusive 
stakeholders in the concept of citizenship.12 As a result of the development 
of global markets for mobility, the sale of citizenship and residence 
entitlements, it is therefore necessary to find solutions to transcend the open 
and closed borders paradigm.13  
Citizenship’s emerging global stakeholder and market sphere requires 
a more transactional, legal and functional citizenship — one that is 
sufficiently formal and flexible to deal with phenomena such as the outright 
sale of citizenship or residence entitlements. 14   There also exists a 
humanitarian and universal side of citizenship, transnational or 
supranational, in addition to and complementing both states and global 
markets, understanding both individuals as well as nation states to owe 
reciprocal duties to all persons — to humanity — so that rights and 
obligations may function beyond state borders.15  
II  Introducing Citizenship by Investment  
This article introduces Citizenship by Investment (‘CBI’), a transactional 
form of citizenship under the conditions of globalization, the modern 
inception of which can be traced to the Caribbean region in the 1980s.16  
Ordinarily, citizenship is directly acquired by way of birthplace under 
the territorial principle (‘ius soli ’) or by descent under the parental 
principle (‘ius sanguinis ’).17 In other cases, citizenship is acquired through 
                                                          
10  Ayelet Shachar and Ran Hirschl, ‘On Citizenship, States and Markets’ (2014) 22(2) The 
Journal of Political Philosophy 231–2. 
11  Everett S Lee, ‘A Theory of Migration’ (1966) 3(1) Demography 49. 
12  See below nn 138–9.  
13  Christof Roos and Lena Laube, ‘Liberal Cosmopolitan Norms and The Border: Local Actors’ 
Critique of Global Processes’ (2015) 15(3) Ethnicities 341; Bellamy, above n 9, 118; Andres 
Solimano, International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization, (Cambridge, 2010) 
78–116. 
14  As to the stakeholders of this market, see below nn 138–9. 
15  Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy (transcribed by Mary J Gregor, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 322; Georg Cavallar, ‘Cosmopolitanisms in Kant’s Philosophy’ (2012) 5(2) 
Ethics and Global Politics 95, 99; See also Rafael Domingo, ‘The New Global Human 
Community’ (2012) 12(2) Chicago Journal of International Law 562. 
16  Most notably in the twin island state of St Kitts and Nevis from 1984, the year of independence 
from the UK. See also Christian H Kalin, Ius Doni: The Acquisition of Citizenship by 
Investment (2016, Ideos) 78, 2010-13 for historical examples of CBI, and 367–7 for St Kitts 
and Nevis. 
17  Maarten P Vink and Gerard-Rene De Groot, Birthright Citizenship: Trends and Regulations 
in Europe 2010/8 (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory, 2010); Chikako Kashiwazaki, ‘Jus Sanguinis in Japan’ (1998) 39(3) 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology 278–300. 
 
 
a naturalization process, by meeting the requirements of substantial 
residence periods, normally involving many years of actual physical 
presence in a country. 18  Residence may indicate the minimum nexus 
required between citizen and the country of choice, and thus function as an 
essential requirement in justifying the grant of citizenship. 19  CBI 
programmes, however, in effect offer individuals the opportunity to 
directly and outright ‘purchase’ the citizenship of the selling state for a 
large, one-off monetary contribution, in return for passports as full status 
passage rights and safety nets.20 CBI, then, is an exceptional, immediate 
form of naturalization, as it comes either without any waiting time, 
including the ordinary requirement of actual, prolonged physical residence, 
or with only nominal and negligible periods of residence.  
Temporal and permanent residency periods, as intermediate steps to 
citizenship, are the most significant checkpoints toward full membership 
in a polity.21 Additional requirements that may attach to naturalization, 
such as language competency or the renunciation of another citizenship 
held, are also left out — criminal history checks aside. For these 
instantaneous or extremely fast-tracked naturalizations, the wealthy who 
can afford direct citizenship’s price need not hold any extraordinary skill 
or talent, but must only be able to summon a large monetary contribution.22 
CBI programmes are valued mainly as means of global mobility 
entitlements in the form of passports for heightened mobility (visa free 
                                                          
18  Required periods of residence can vary of anything between 2–15 years; Solimano, above n 
13, 48.     
19  Ayelet Shachar has introduced the idea of actual, functional, substantial ties between citizen 
and polity, ius nexi, that may suffice to give rise to citizenship. Applying this idea to CBI, the 
only real nexus is a one-off payment: Ayelet Shachar, ‘Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons 
for Immigration Reform’ (2011) 23(1) Yale Law Journal 110, 116. 
20  Ayelet Shachar, ‘Citizenship for Sale?’, in Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Bauboeck, Irene 
Bloemraad, and Maarten Vink (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (2017, Oxford 
University Press), 789-816; Madeleine Sumption and Kate Hooper, Selling Visas and 
Citizenship: Policy Questions from the Global Boom in Investor Immigration (Migration 
Policy Intitute, 2014) 1–13; Christian Joppke, ‘Instrumental Citizenship — An Empirical-
cum-Normative Inquiry’ (2016) Paper presented at the Investment Migration Council 
Academic Day (6 June 2016), Geneva (forthcoming); Christian Joppke, ‘Citizenship and 
Immigration’ (Polity Press, 2010); Jelena Dzankic, ‘The Pros And Cons Of Ius Pecuniae: 
Investor Citizenship In Comparative Perspective’ (2012) (14) European University Institute 
Working Papers, EUI; Ayelet Shachar and Rainer Bauböck (eds), Should Citizenship be for 
Sale? (European University Institute RSCAS Working Paper 2014/01, Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2014). 
21  Again, direct naturalization through CBI bypasses this step. See also Kim Rubenstein, 
‘Review Essay: The Centrality of Migration to Citizenship’ (2010) 7(2) Citizenship Studies 
255–6. 
22  These mercantile ‘cash for passport’ bargains refer not to human capital, but to capital per se 
in exchange for immediate membership. The law firm Henley and Partners describes CBI 
programs as existing to ‘[e]nable individuals to naturalize and acquire full legal citizenship 
status by making an exceptional economic contribution to another country. Most of the 
programs are structured to ensure that the investment contributes to the welfare, advancement 
and economic development of the country offering such a program’. See Henley and Partners, 





travel),23 as well as for protection and political diversification in the form 
of utilizing states as an insurance against political uncertainties 
elsewhere.24 Unlike investor migration referring to economic gains, CBI 
utilizes the monetary contribution, even when in form of an investment, as 
a key for the purchase of citizenship.25 With citizenship as the primary goal, 
CBI investments are not, then, always attractive from the viewpoints of 
economic profit or risk.26     
 Other forms of exceptional naturalization outside CBI legal 
mechanisms include discretionary direct transformations of skilled 
strangers as human capital into citizens where this is in the public interest.27 
For example this can be achieved by way of enlisting prospective soldiers, 
trading service for instantaneous citizenship.28 This also includes direct 
naturalizations of elite athletes, famous artists,29 or any deserving person.30 
                                                          
23  CBI schemes exist mostly for the ultra-wealthy who want hassle-free, unrestricted global 
mobility and immediate access to political safety in stable communities, as well as financial, 
tax or healthcare benefits. See generally Yen-Fen Tseng, ‘The Mobility of Entrepreneurs and 
Capital: Taiwanese Capital-Linked Migration’ (2000) 38(2) International Migration 143–68. 
24  Japan and Singapore, currently the top listed countries for visa free travel, allow visa free 
access to 180 countries, followed by Germany with 179 countries, Australia to 174 countries, 
the Russian Federation to 114 and China to 64. Afghanistan, at the other end of the spectrum, 
only does so for 24 countries; Henley and Partners, above n 22. See also Justin Spinney, 
Rachel Aldred and Katrina Brown, ‘Geographies of Citizenship in Everyday (Im)Mobility’ 
(2015) 64 Geoforum 325. 
25  Ordinary investment migration also comes with often substantial residence requirements. 
Non-CBI investor visa also normally follow clearly outlined rules and procedures, whereas 
CBI may be more discretionary. See, eg, the Austrian CBI scheme; Alfred M Boll, Multiple 
Nationality and International Law (Nijhoff, 2007) 112.  
26  Peyman Kiaras-Attari, ‘EB-5 Investment: It’s all about the risk’ (2017) 1 Trade and Invest in 
America 88. This focus on citizenship as personal status for travel and protection is perhaps 
more akin to individual ‘lifestyle migration’, unless citizenship is itself viewed as an economic 
asset or investment. See Caroline Oliver, ‘Lifestyle Migration’ in Alexander Betts (ed) Global 
Migration Governance (Oxford, 2011) 133, 144. 
27  CBI migrants, on the other hand, do not need to be talented or skilled, or able to regain the 
funds used for entry in to the polity. See generally Martijn van den Brink, ‘Investment 
Residence and the Concept of Residence in EU Law: Internations, Tensions, and 
Opportunities’ (2017) 1 Investment Migration Working Papers, Investment Migration Council 
3. 
28  For example, fast-tracking from three years to one day waiting time for US citizenship. See 
Jesse M Cunha et al, ‘Expedited Citizenship for Sale: Estimating the Effect of Executive Order 
13269 On Noncitizen Military Enlistments’ (2014) 46(11) Applied Economics 1291.  
29  David Owen, ‘Trading citizenship, human capital and the European Union’ in Ayelet Shachar 
and Rainer Bauböck (eds), Should Citizenship be for Sale? (European University Institute 
RSCAS Working Paper 2014/01, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory, 2014) 31, 32; Ayelet Shachar, ‘Picking Winners: Olympic 
Citizenship and the Global Race for Talent’ (2011) 120(8) The Yale Law Journal 2088; Ayelet 
Shachar, ‘The race for talent: highly skilled migrants and competitive immigration regimes’ 
(2006) 81 New York University Law Review 148; Francesca Strumia, ‘New-generation 
Skilled Migration Policies and the Changing Fabric of Membership: Talent as Output and the 
Headhunting State’ (2016) 4 Investment Migration Working Paper No. 4. 
30  See William Branigin, Simeon Tegel and Karla Adam, ‘Equador grants citizenship to Julian 
Assange in bid to end London embassy standoff’, The Washington Post (online) 11 January 
2018 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ecuador-grants-citizenship-to-julian-
assange-in-bid-to-end-london-embassy-standoff/2018/01/11/55a4f232-f6ec-11e7-b34a-b856 
26af34ef_story.html?utm_term=.bf2896988015>; Owen Bowcott, ‘Julian Assange is made an 
Ecuadorian citizen in effort to resolve impasse’ The Guardian (online), 12 January 2018 
 
 
Residence by Investment (‘RBI’), then, refers to the “cash for visa” fast-
tracked acquisition of residence rights.31  
III  Conceptions and Transformations of Citizenship Law  
The act of naturalization — of turning a non-member into a ‘citizen’ — has 
always borne an air of ‘legal magic’, resulting in this area of public law 
being highly sensitive, regulated and politicised. 32  Citizenship is a 
contested, evolving concept.33 In the world of nation-states, citizenship has 
long held a quasi-sacred status, which refers to identity and solidarity in 
cohesive communities, and is foundational to the right to active political 
participation, social cohesion and for civic equality. 34  John Rawls 
highlights reciprocal rights and duties under a conception of the good. 
Rawls refers to citizens as free, self-authenticating human beings, who are 
presumed to be rational and capable of taking responsibility. 35 
Citizenship’s legitimacy depends on political and societal participation.36 
It is the capacity to ‘[i]nstitutionalize the rights of citizens in an 
appropriately egalitarian way’.37  In political liberalism, citizenship is a 
concept understood to focus on the citizens’ rights, limited by fellow 
citizens’ rights, referring to political persons contributing to the common 
good and to shared interests of the citizenry. 38  Citizenship’s most 
recognizable aspect is its guarantee of legal rights, the ‘right to have rights’ 
as the prime right associated with national membership, guaranteed and 
                                                          
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/jan/11/julian-assange-is-made-ecuadorian-
citizen-in-effort-to-resolve-impasse>.  
31  ‘RBI’ is the preferred option if one would otherwise lose one’s existing citizenship when 
acquiring new citizenship. RBI may include programs that offer permanent residence based 
solely on the demonstration of minimal funds to support oneself: Dimitry Kochenov, Roxana 
Barbulescu and Suryapratim Roy, Investment Migration in the World (2015, Investment 
Migration Council) 6–8; van den Brink, above n 27. 
32  Rainer Bauböck and Sara Wallace Goodman (2010) Naturalisation, EUDO Citizenship Brief 
No 2. 
33  See John Greville and Agard Pocock, ‘The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times’ in 
Ronald Beiner (ed), Theorizing Citizenship (State University of New York Press, 1995) 29–
52. 
34  Thomas Humphrey Marshall explains citizenship as a set of rights and duties bestowed on 
those who are full, equal members of a community: Thomas Humphrey Marshall, Citizenship 
and Social Class and Other Essays, (Cambridge, 1950) 28. See also Derek Heater, What is 
Citizenship? (Polity, 1999); Etienne Balibar, Citizenship (Polity, 2015); John Torpey, The 
Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State (Cambridge, 2000). 
35  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996) 30, 32; John Rawls, The 
Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1999). See also Jonathan Crowe, Legal Theory 
(Lawbook Co, 2nd ed, 2014) 197. 
36  Engin F Isin and Greg M Nielsen (eds) Acts of Citizenship (Zed Books, 2008).   
37  Magnette, above n 2, 15. 
38  Angela Kallhoff, ‘The Normative Limits of Consumer Citizenship’ (2016) 29 Journal Agric 
Environ Ethics 23, 26, citing John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 
1996); Richard Bellamy and Antonio Palumbo, Citizenship (Ashgate, 2010); Stephen Castles 
and Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration, Globalization and the politics of belonging 
(Macmillan, 2000) 26; Derek Heater, above n 34; Bart van Steenbergen, The condition of 
Citizenship (Sage, 1994); Keith Faulks, Citizenship, (Routledge, 2000). 
 
 
protected by the state, from which other rights within that polity can derive 
(such as a right to political participation, health care, education).39  
Citizenship is a fundamental concept for connecting citizens to nation 
states, which is intrinsically connected to the concepts of statehood and 
state sovereignty.40 Citizenship has for a long time been viewed as a ‘[d]ebt 
of gratitude which cannot be forfeited, cancelled, or altered, by any change 
of time, place and circumstance...’41 The status right of citizenship, then, 
excludes all non-citizens from the polity as ‘aliens’.42 Keith Faulks opines 
that ‘[a] citizens’ income is a policy that removes citizenship’s dependence 
upon the market and de-commodifies rights in ways which are likely to 
encourage a more activist and progressive citizenry’. 43  However, 
citizenship allows persons to function as integrated and competent 
members in a society. Contrary to Faulks view, citizenship also includes 
economic integration, as citizenship status both allows for and shapes the 
flow of resources between persons and social groups within the polity.44 
According to Carolina Nunez, it is useful to distinguish between formal 
citizenship (which Nunez calls ‘pathways’ to citizenship) and material or 
substantive citizenship. Substantive citizenship includes not only the 
formal guarantee of equal rights, but adds the notions of belonging, 
inclusion and shared identity.45  
The historical meaning of being a citizen has fluctuated.46 The Greek 
Aristotelian paradigm of an exclusive, active and participatory citizenship 
as the reign of full and equal members, gave way to a more functional, 
flexible citizenship in the Roman juristic tradition and its later 
                                                          
39  Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Schocken Books, revised ed 2004), 376. See 
also Perez v Brownell, 356 US 44, 64 (Chief Justice Earl Warren) (1958); Afroyim v. Rusk, 
387 US 253 (1967); T Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer (eds), Citizenship Today: 
Global Perspectives and Practices (Brookings Institute, 2010). 
40  See Linda Bosniak, ‘Varieties of Citizenship’ (2007) 75 Fordham Law Review 2449, 2451; 
Ayelet Shachar, ‘Citizenship and Global Distribution of Opportunity’ in Engin F Isin, Peter 
Nyes and Bryan S Turner (eds) Citizenship between Past and Future (Routledge, 2008) 139; 
Engin F Isin and Patricia K Wood, Citizenship and Identity (Sage, 1999); Faulks, above n 38, 
29; Sangeetha Pillai, ‘The Rights and Responsibilities of Australian Citizenship: A Legislative 
Analysis’ (2014) 37 Melbourne University Law Review 736.   
41  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (University of Chicago Press, 
1979) 357. 
42  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism (Verso, 1983). 
43  Faulks, above n 38, 130–1. 
44  Engin F Isin and Bryan S Turner, ‘Citizenship Studies: An Introduction’ in Engin F Isin and 
Bryan S Turner (eds), Handbook of Citizenship Studies (Sage, 2002) 1, 2. See also Richard 
Bellamy and Antonio Palumbo, Citizenship (Ashgate, 2010); Stephen Castles and Alastair 
Davidson, Citizenship and Migration, Globalization and the Politics of Belonging (Macmillan, 
2000) 26; Faulks, above n 38; Engin F Isin and Patricia Wood Citizenship and Identity (Sage, 
1999). 
45  D Carolina Nunez, ‘Mapping Citizenship: Status, Membership, and the Path in Between’ 
(Research Paper No 15–25 18–19, J Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham University, 2016); 
D Carolina Nunez, ‘War of the Words: Aliens, Immigrants, Citizens, and the Language of 
Exclusion’ (2013) Brigham Young University Law Review 1517. 
46  Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione and Jo Shaw, ‘Introduction: From National to 
Transnational Citizenship’ in Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione and Jo Shaw (eds), Making 
European Citizens, Civic Inclusion in a Transnational Context (Palgrave, 2006) 1–31.  
 
 
developments in medieval and early modern natural law. There was thus a 
paradigm shift away from the Athenian assumption of an ‘ideal’ equality 
that only worked to the exclusion of others, towards the Roman 
understanding of citizenship as a model in commerce, relating to persons 
and ‘things.’ Property rights and civil private law provided the model for 
the citizen’s place in society, having contracted out of natural liberty for a 
right to protection by the emerging concept of the nation state.47 Citizens 
were no longer seen as public agents, but as subjects, oriented less toward 
political action for the common good than the pursuit of their personal 
goals under the protection of the law, welfare and public power. This 
concentration of power and control in the state, both protecting as well as 
limiting the individual as a smaller unit within the state, then also led to the 
rights of the citizen being perceived as ‘subjective’ rights. CBI is therefore 
perhaps best conceptualised as being rooted in Roman conceptions of 
citizenship, which were sufficiently versatile, functional and ‘thin’ to be 
applied throughout the variables of an empire.48  
Facing de-territorialisation and globalization of citizenship, and with 
citizens, states and markets now directly interfacing with one another, it is 
timely to again rethink the legal concept of Westphalian citizenship. 49  In 
a bid to hypermobility, persons now appear to follow the rules of capital 
migration. As one of the most powerful transitions of citizenship at present, 
a market bound CBI then appears as the liaison between public law of 
citizenship and the private market side for citizenship. When CBI as 
citizenship for sale is advertised as ‘global citizenship’, it is not clear 
whether this refers to the globalization of citizenship on the market sphere, 
or whether a claim is made to supranational citizenship, perhaps combining 
free movement rights available on markets before the backdrop of both 
national and universal human rights standards.50  
                                                          
47  Ibid 3. 
48  See also Nunez, Mapping Citizenship, above n 45; See also Patrick Weil, ‘Access to 
Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws’ in T Alexander Aleinikoff and 
D Klusmeyer (eds), Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices (Carnegie 
Endowment Funds for International Peace, 2001) 17–35; Kristin Surak, ‘Global Citizenship 
2.0, The Growth of Citizenship by Investment Programs’ (2016) 3 Investment Migration 
Working Papers Investment Migration Council 35. 
49  For instance, Vanuatu accepts bitcoin payments for its USD200 000 CBI program and pilots 
blockchain based decentralized transactional due diligence processes (not yet applying to 
membership legitimizations as such), whereas Estonia allows for virtual e-residency as digital 
membership to anyone in the world: Editorial, ‘Vanuatu Citizenship Program to accept bitcoin 
payments, pilot block chain based due diligence’, Investment Migration Insider (online), 
October 4, 2017 <https://imidaily.com/asia-pacific/vanuatu-citizenship-program-accept-
bitcoin-payments-pilot-block-chain-based-due-diligence>. See also Government of Estonia, 
What is E-Residency, <https://e-resident.gov.ee/>; Costica Dumbrava and Rainer Bauböck 
(eds), Bloodlines and Belonging: Time to Abandon Ius Sanguinis? RSCAS 2015/80 EUI 
Working Papers 1. 
50  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (‘UDHR’), 10 December 1948, 217 A(III) art 13(2). 
See also International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), adopted 16 Dec 
1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 12(2); Dimitry Kochenov, ‘The 
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IV  Characterizing the Current Elements and Practice of CBI: 
A Rights Based Approach 
Citizenship status matters. For Michael Walzer, ‘[t]he rule of citizens over 
non-citizens, of members over strangers, is probably the most common 
form of tyranny in human history.’51 A democratic, libertarian citizenship 
should rely on fairness, reciprocity and equality.52 For this, governments 
are obliged protect the interests of all people within their territory, not just 
citizens.53  
The interplay between citizens, states and markets is complex and, at 
this time, unclear. Some of CBI’s potential ripple effects include erosion, 
commodification, privatization, incoherence or fragmentation of 
citizenship.54 Citizenship’s direct sale may pose a challenge to national 
sovereignty, power and control of the selling state. The effects of CBI on 
the concepts of nationality and citizenship are currently underexplored, 
with empirical research in this field scarce.55   
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Changing Role of Nationality in International Law (Routledge, 2013); Margaret Somers, 
‘Romancing the Market, Reviling the State: Historizing Liberalism, Privatization, and the 
Competing Claims to Civil Society’ in Colin Crouch, Klaus Eder and Damian Tambini (eds), 
Citizenship, Markets, and the State (Oxford University Press, 2001) 23–4; Bellamy, above n 
9, 114. 
51  Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Basic Books, 1983) 52. 
52  Ana Tanasoca, ‘Citizenship for Sale — Neomedieval, not just neoliberal?’ (2016) 57(1) 
European Journal of Sociology 169, 192.  
53  Rubenstein, above n 21, 257. 
54  Peter J Spiro, ‘Cash for Passports and the End of Citizenship’ in Ayelet Shachar and Rainer 
Bauböck (2014) EUI RSCAS Working Paper 2014/1, 9–10. By transmuting rights into 
contracts, the practice of commodified, direct market citizenship may lead to the 
fragmentation and erosion of citizenship’s foundations. See, eg, Margaret R Somers, 
Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). See also Michael B Katz, ‘On Genealogies of Citizenship by 
Margaret Somers’ (2011) 9 Socio-Economic Review 395; Michael B Katz, ‘Citizenship, 
Statelessness and Market Fundamentalism’ in Y Michal Bodemann and Gokce Yurdakul (eds) 
Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 25; Michael B Katz, ‘Romancing 
the Market, Reviling the State: Historizing Liberalism, Privatization, and the Competing 
Claims to Civil Society’ in Colin Crouch, Klaus Eder and Damian Tambini (eds), Citizenship, 
Markets, and the State (Oxford University Press, 2001) 23; Richard Falk, ‘The Decline of 
Citizenship in an Era of Globalization’ (2000) 4 Citizen Studies 5–6. 
55  See, eg, Vesco Paskalev, ‘If You Do Not Like Selling Passports, Give Them for Free to Those 
Who Deserve Them’, in Ayelet Shachar and Rainer Bauböck (eds) Should Citizensip be for 
Sale? (EUI Working Paper No RSCA 2014/01, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2014) 25–6; Roxana Barbulescu, ‘Global Mobility Corridors 
for the Ultra-Rich: The Neoliberal Transformation of Citizenship’ in Ayelet Shachar and 
Rainer Bauböck (eds) Should Citizensip be for Sale? (EUI Working Paper No RSCA 2014/01, 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2014) 15–6; 
Surak, above n 48, 2–7. 
 
 
A  Exceptional Naturalizations Without Time of Residence 
In CBI programmes, residence — the most important factor in the law of 
naturalization, and thus, state control over citizens — is missing or reduced 
to negligible, formal periods of days instead of years.56 Likewise, for so 
called ‘Residence by Investment laws’ (‘RBI’), waivers and substantial 
reductions in time often correlate with considerable fees. Without a 
substantial time period of actual physical residence subject to state 
authority prior to acquisition of citizenship, the membership’s claim for 
political equality may be an empty one.57 CBI naturalization is paradoxical: 
CBI does not require any period of residence, or, if it does, these periods 
are often negligible and perhaps absurd where one views naturalization as 
a gradual process in which a migrant should become or turn into a citizen.58 
Despite criminal history checks, without preliminary residence periods 
CBI states do not really know who the migrant is, nor their attitude towards 
the country and existing social values.59  
The question is, however, how much relevance the concept of residence 
still holds in the process of naturalization and in constituting a citizenry. As 
Christian Kalin notes, there is an increasing incongruence between 
constituent people and the resident population. This incongruence is in part 
due to economic globalization, higher international migration flows, 
cultural, social and ethnic plurality, cross border affiliations and 
digitalization. 60  As CBI’s focus is on the generation of revenue, not 
necessarily the person, the CBI migrant then appears as an almost 
impersonal and exchangeable facilitator within the light of CBI’s more or 
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not require, bypass, waive, reduce to zero, or assume residence by way of legal fiction. 
General examples include the Caribbean joint island state of Antigua and Barbuda, which has 
no residence requirement. However, deprivation of citizenship may occur if the citizen does 
not spend at least five (originally 35) days during the period of five calendar years after the 
grant of citizenship. See s 4 of the Antigua and Barbuda Citizenship by Investment Act  2013 
(Antigua and Barbuda). The development fund contribution option is a non-refundable 
contribution to the National Development Fund of at least USD250 000. There is a real-estate 
investment option and a business investment option. Likewise, in Dominica, there is no 
residence requirement. Section 101 of the Dominica Constitution and ss 8 and 20(1) of the 
Dominica Citizenship Act 1978 (Commonwealth of Dominica), Commonwealth of Dominica 
Citizenship by Investment Regulations 2014 (Commonwealth of Dominica) and 
Commonwealth of Dominica Citizenship by Investment (Amendment) Regulations 2016 
(Commonwealth of Dominica) grant instant citizenship by a Certificate of Naturalization for 
a payment of USD100 000 into the government fund or USD200 000 investment in real estate. 
There is no residency requirement in the Cyprus scheme for naturalization of investors by 
exception. See s 111A(2) of the Civil Registry Laws of 141(I)/2002–2015 (Cyprus). The 
contribution is USD2 Million. 
57  Owen, above n 29, 31. 
58  It is highly questionable whether one can ‘naturalise’ within a few days. See also, and less 
critically, Kochenov, Barbulsecu and Roy, above n 31, 42; Madeleine Sumption, ‘The 
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less transactional nature as the transfer of wealth. The CBI migrant may 
not even have a real need to purchase a particular citizenship, but could 
purchase any citizenship, as long as the new citizenship improves current 
mobility in the form of visa free travel rights and enhances political 
diversification and protection. 61  CBI therefore also appears to be 
exceptional and indeterminate in that it depends on the decision of the CBI 
migrant as to whether to reside or participate in the CBI state. Thus, CBI 
contracts function to directly access citizenship status, with actual 
residence being a mere future option that depends on whether the new 
passport holder ever wishes to settle. 
B  Acceptance of CBI — Nottebohm’s Genuine Link 
Acceptance of CBI is another important element, both nationally (in regard 
to the existing citizenry) and internationally. An early form of CBI is the 
1955 decision of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in Nottebohm 
(Liechtenstein v Guatemala).62 This case shows that acceptance of CBI by 
other states may be missing where there is no genuine link between the 
citizen and the selling state. The ICJ doubted this link in view of the 
exceptional circumstances of Nottebohm’s naturalization — in particular 
the speed and ease with which Liechtenstein granted his passport. Further 
factors were that the sole aim of attaining citizenship was said to come 
within Liechtenstein’s diplomatic protection, and to enhance personal 
mobility without a real interest in the selling state’s way of life or traditions. 
Actual connections with Liechtenstein were ‘extremely tenuous.’ 
Guatemala was thus not required to recognise Nottebohm’s Liechtenstein 
citizenship, as there was no ‘real and effective’ nationality.63 Today, the 
requirement of a ‘genuine connection’ should be viewed with care, as it is 
closely associated with the concept of allegiance between citizen and state, 
and decided at a time when dual citizenship was likened to bigamy.64  
As a right of direct access, CBI may be seen to refer to static 
membership — a given rather than a process in the making — which is 
identified mainly by the contracts and payments through which it has been 
established.65 In this respect, CBI is somewhat comparable with direct, 
inherited conditions of membership. As such, CBI as ‘cash for passports’ 
may be no more or less ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ than the randomness and 
potential inequalities of birthright citizenship.66  
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C  Commodified ‘Thin’ Citizenship and Classes of Citizenship  
A transactional, ‘thin’ CBI does not refer to a material, substantiated 
citizenship as a form of identity. However minimalistic, CBI is still legal 
citizenship, granting full formal status rights and the choice to access a 
given demos.67  
In order to sell citizenship, CBI may, at least temporarily at the moment 
of its sale, become reduced to a formal legal minimum, so that states can 
assume complete control over citizenship as a commodity. A citizenship 
sold may de-commodify, pending further actions of the CBI citizen such as 
visits or participation. This ‘thinness’ makes CBI sufficiently flexible and 
transactional to be sold without residence or other established genuine link 
requirements of acceptance.  
A ‘thin’ CBI may create degrees, fragments or classes of citizenship. 
For example, St Kitts and Nevis places voting restrictions on its CBI 
citizens, and Cyprus requires CBI citizens to hold residential property of at 
least EUR 500,000.00 at all times, effectively creating two classes of 
citizen.68 CBI could, thus, be seen as transactional, purposive, formal-legal, 
passive, or perhaps public-private citizenship, focussing predominantly on 
payment rather than making reference to material factors of active 
citizenship.69   
D  The Price of CBI as Resource for Global Mobility  
At first sight, direct ‘cash for passport’ sales may appear as exceptional 
measures, relating to times of national emergency. 70  CBI sales are, 
however, not limited in this way.  
CBI’s value may be set through various internal variables and external 
factors in the broader geopolitical context. 71  The latter could include 
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regional or bilateral alliances, which may prove essential for CBI to retain 
value.72 
CBI’s comparably high price of up to a few million AUS$ per passport 
may create artificial scarcity, further raising the economic value of 
citizenship as a resource for global mobility.73 Here, in view of the right to 
leave any country in art 13(2) of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (‘UDHR’), there may be a constraint on overly high prices so as to 
avoid financial deterrents for applicants.74 In a European Union context, 
immigration fees are required to be ‘reasonable’.75 
It is yet unclear whether citizenship’s price is or will be determined by 
states, markets, or perhaps both. While the decision to sell citizenship, as 
well as citizenship’s valuation, may initially be within the sole power and 
control of the selling state, the price of citizenship, as well as other features 
of CBI, may subsequently become co-determined by the global market for 
the sale of citizenship.76 As Peter Spiro observes, ‘[i]nvestor programmes 
show that citizenship is still worth something. As the market thickens, we 
will see how much [and will be] able approximately to isolate the value of 
citizenship itself...’77 CBI contracts generate revenue for the CBI state and, 
in some instances (such as small island states), the entire state’s economy 
depends on CBI gains. At other times, CBI revenue may be diverted to 
philanthropic causes or be marginal compared to the GDP.  
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E  The Practice of CBI: States, Migrants, Markets — Whose 
Citizenship to Sell? 
States selling citizenship assume complete initial power and control over 
the concept of citizenship. 78  For Javier Hidalgo, states can prevent 
foreigners from acquiring residence or citizenship. In turn, it may be 
permissible for the state to give the same foreigners the option of buying 
citizenship.79   
The role of the sovereign in modern legal systems, however, is not 
absolute, but constitutionally limited, with no single body of power 
completely in control of the concept of citizenship.80 It seems puzzling that 
the selling state is acting at the same time as the public trustee or guardian 
over public law citizenship, as well as the key market regulator, sole 
producer and end-seller of citizenship, transforming citizenship into an 
exclusive good or scarce resource.81 While the state may ensure everything 
in its powers for the protection and advancement of CBI and its investor 
citizens, the motive for such action may not be clear. The state could 
primarily hold a vested interested in the protection of the scheme’s flow of 
revenue, ensuring CBI’s value, marketed image and acceptance, rather than 
acting out of concern for the new citizens. 
Martin Walzer warns that CBI may result in an inappropriate mingling 
of markets and states. 82  The practice of CBI has caused political 
controversies in a number of countries because it circumvents ordinary 
naturalization, tax evasion, money laundering, admission of criminals, the 
issuing of diplomatic passports to non-diplomats, and other influence on 
political power.83 CBI schemes have seen unfettered government discretion, 
randomness or inconsistency in decision-making, lack of control 
mechanisms including independent oversight, transparency, due diligence 
and complaint mechanisms as well as outright corruption.84  
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These fast-paced schemes expose the CBI-countries that run them to 
the macro-economic volatilities and potential erosion caused by global 
markets.85 Attempts to control CBI programmes are not surprising, as CBI 
schemes do not relate to active, state-controlled political citizenship, but 
are rather a billion-dollar industry for the sale of passports for rights to 
mobility and protection on a global market scale.86 For Michael Sandel, 
CBI represents the ‘[e]xpansion of markets, and of market values, into 
spheres of life where they don’t belong.’87  
CBI as market citizenship is demand-driven and case-bound 
‘citizenship at work’, with major corporations intermingling as actual, real 
market players between citizens and states.88 The economic logic behind 
CBI as a facilitated, fast-tracked naturalization for investors may lead to 
evolving standardisations, harmonisations and market adjustments of 
immigration law and policy on a global sphere — to the benefit of some 
and detriment of other states, migrants and stakeholders — and to a 
‘citizenship under market’ rule.89  If this economic approach to citizenship 
prevails, CBI purchases could be followed by the actual exchange of 
citizenship or residence entitlements in direct trade between citizens, 
within, or perhaps outside, the state’s permission.90     
F  CBI as Property: Commodification, Erosion, or Equality?  
Citizenship rights could be understood as property rights, amenable to sale 
and purchase in the same manner as open market commodities, such as 
corn or gold.91 In this regard, the image and role of the CBI state may 
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degrade to that of a container, gatekeeper or controller of passports — the 
migrant, in turn, that of a consumer.92 
A full, material, reciprocal and participatory ‘thick’ citizenship is a 
measure of a functioning democracy.93 Citizenship is a condition of civic 
equality. It is a political membership where all citizens can determine the 
terms of social cooperation on an equal basis.94 Citizenship as an item of 
trade, while subjected to market rule, is an opportunity for sovereign States 
to gain and prosper from a valuable asset created virtually ́ out of thin air´.95  
From one point of view, CBI migrants could be seen as equals in 
payment, and perhaps even relatively equal bargaining partners with states. 
On this view, CBI has the potential to free citizenship from arbitrary 
exclusions.96 According to Dimitry Kochenov, for example, ‘price-bound 
citizenship’ may be less arbitrary and more transparent than territorial or 
parental acquisition of citizenship and no longer subject to mechanisms of 
arbitrary approval such as language or cultural tests.97  With CBI, states, 
from a presumed and unalterable given, become an object of choice and 
contestation.’98 At the origin of states and nations lies an ideological myth 
of descent as a ‘constant ideological spectacle’.99  The identity side of 
citizenship can be seen as artificial, ensuring that people are ready to 
sacrifice it all, while states and nations must be seen as sacred, possessing 
inherent good.100  
CBI may here be explained with the ‘economic club good theory’ of 
citizenship. States co-opt with individuals and markets who invest money 
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in the polity (‘club’). In a cost-benefit analysis, only those people who can 
help to decrease the shared costs of the community should be admitted.101 
A formal legal view, as well as an economic view of citizenship, may show 
that, reduced to a formal, legal perspective, being a citizen depends on the 
possession of the status of citizenship in accordance with the law of a 
particular jurisdiction, to which certain rights can be attached.102 From a 
minimalistic, formal legal perspective, ‘citizenship’ could function with 
minimal or even no intrinsic ethical content.’103 Citizenship’s core element 
is exclusion, and the grounds for inclusion are ‘[a]s variable as they are 
random.’104   
Conversely, CBI schemes could be seen to allow for the systematic 
transfer of wealth in exchange for rights, referring to fast-track citizenship 
for the admission of the wealthiest migrants, and to the passive criteria of 
a specific class (‘the ultra-rich’), and not in terms of merit based (including 
investment skills) selection.105 For Martin Walzer, this breaks the ‘sphere 
boundary of money’ by unlocking blocked exchanges that limit the 
dominance of wealth.’ 106  CBI quietly assumes that only wealthy 
individuals are able to offer a significant contribution to a state’s 
economy.107 However, there is yet no guarantee that the CBI migrant is able 
to repeat the feat of wealth creation, or was the originator of such wealth 
in the first place. For Owen, CBI practices support ‘the emergence of 
transnational class and status stratification in which mobility rights become 
radically unequally distributed…’ and are thus ‘[n]ot compatible with the 
democratic legitimacy of states.’108  
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This neoliberalisation of citizenship entails that the policy-making 
process does not give impartial consideration to all those whose morally 
significant interests are affected by these citizenship policies. 109  Legal 
references to the reciprocity of costs and benefits, to the existing citizenry 
and to a broader, more inclusive spectrum of social strata perspectives 
beyond the ultra-wealthy, are currently missing in CBI. 110  The direct 
exchange of citizenship for money may ultimately erode public trust.111 
The barter for membership may send a ‘terrible signal’ about what makes 
a good citizen and to whom the contemporary market-friendly state gives 
priority.112 CBI reduces citizenship as a last bastion of sovereignty to a 
legal transaction with a mercenary-like quality.113 No nexi between the 
country and the passport’s recipient are required.114  
It is difficult to add to these competing views from a solely national 
perspective on citizenship. In times of globalization, one may be tempted 
to suggest new nexi, or genuine links of membership, especially as state 
run CBI schemes are now existing, and highly sought after phenomena, 
conferring both rights of internal access as well as external, heightened 
global mobility, and thus, connecting national, international and global 
(market) spheres.115  
CBI may be one of the many examples of existing, underlying global 
inequality, opening borders for the ultra-rich in alignment with the 
neoliberal free market driven by supply and demand.116 CBI, as is true of 
all forms of citizenship, may create (global) inequalities, as it exists in a 
world of regulated mobility and unequal distribution of opportunity.117 CBI, 
however, restricts the benefits of direct naturalizations to those that are able 
and willing to pay, and in doing so, through global markets, touches on 
multiple strata that go beyond national inequalities, perhaps offering 
different, supranational opportunities for improvement.118  
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G  General Approach: CBI Legal Mechanisms for All 
Migrants? 
At the present time, CBI programmes are commonly seen as legal isolates, 
run by the tiniest of nations, mostly island states, and include only a very 
small, negligible fraction of extremely wealthy migrants. 119  The 
programmes are thus said to have no real relevance for the institute of 
citizenship.120 Jo Shaw argues that the ‘[e]ffects of the Maltese provisions 
will be marginal in terms of numbers [with] little impact on other European 
Union (‘EU’) member states.’121 Dimitry Kochenov states that ‘[t]he scale 
of [Maltese CBI] sales will remain small.’122 Madeleine Sumption also 
questions the actual economic benefits of CBI elite programmes for larger 
states.123 Yet, if not completely incorrect, the above assumptions may not 
necessarily hold for long. The theory of CBI could create profound ripple 
effects where extended beyond elite programmes and small territories. 
Both the number of CBI citizens and the number of CBI states may grow 
substantially, virtually overnight, especially within existing regional 
polities such as the EU or the conceptional spaces of local, regional and 
global markets.124  
There are no conceptual barriers that prevent CBI’s legal mechanisms 
from being applied to most states and migrants. A recent example is the 
2016 case of the Productivity Commission, an Australian think tank, 
considering Nobel laureate Gary Becker’s idea of selling or auctioning off 
(in this case) residence entitlements for a set admission fee to virtually all 
migrants.125 While this idea was ultimately rejected, the example shows 
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that CBI or RBI may find general application by major migration nations 
to the total of existing and future migrants. In this way, so-called ‘Becker 
schemes’ could impact on the nature and development of citizenship and 
residence worldwide. Becker schemes are a form of CBI, extended toward 
a comparably low-cost (when compared to other CBI schemes, in this case, 
a flat fee of AUS$ 50,000), direct and general sale of most, if not all 
migration entitlements within a polity. Had the proposal been implemented, 
Australia could have created a contentious, yet large scale source of 
revenue, fuelled by the total number of current immigrants (excepting 
humanitarian migration). Should a nation follow a charge-based approach 
to all citizenship or residence entitlements beyond the ultra-wealthy, the 
impact on citizenship, global markets, as well as the CBI industry, could 
be profound.126 Where the standard fee proposal is coupled with waivers 
or support through public or private loan schemes akin to the widespread 
practice of student loans, or perhaps, through crowdfunding, CBI and RBI 
legal mechanisms could find much wider application.  
Becker schemes may perhaps assist in balancing or overcoming 
inequalities and exclusions created by price distortions for exceptional 
naturalizations in high-class elite programmes, as well as the often unfair 
and random inclusions and exclusions of any person in regards to 
conventional birthright citizenship. 127  In this way, state control over 
admissions could be further refined, and reference to the public greater 
good or humanity made, including migration without, or with part or fully 
state supported admissions through payments, beyond a CBI merely 
equalling revenue generation.   
H  Plural (Dual and Multiple) CBI 
CBI encourages, requires, presupposes and creates plural (dual and 
multiple) citizenship, as well as reduces (‘thins’) and individualises the 
connection between the citizen and the state to a transactional level. In this 
way, CBI appears to contribute to some detachment of citizenship from the 
single nation state, vesting the concept within a mercantile, as well as a 
fundamental rights approach to citizenship. Could CBI perhaps be a 
blueprint for international or a global mercantile citizenship, for mixed 
identities beyond the allegiance to one single nation alone? In other words, 
could CBI become an international standard or even proto-global 
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citizenship? According to some scholars, plural citizenship may become 
the norm.128  For Peter Spiro, CBI is  
[n]ot the cause, but a consequence of the changing perception of the core of 
state power and the relationship between the individual and the state as no 
longer being a ‘sacred bond’: CBI is just another symptom of the inevitable 
decline of citizenship due to globalization, alongside the increasing toleration 
of dual — (and multiple) citizenship (which CBI is one venue to create).129 
Plural citizenship was once seen as a menace of divided loyalties.130 
However, today, this is changing, and the ‘passport mix’ is becoming more 
than just tolerated.131 The 1992 judgment of the European Court of Justice 
(‘ECJ’) in Micheletti established that EU member states must recognise the 
supranational ‘EU part’ of a person’s dual citizenship, as to do otherwise 
would deprive that person of the benefit of free movement rights within the 
EU.132 It is not clear whether the sale of member state citizenship affects 
the status of EU citizenship.133 What appears clear is that value is added to 
the respective citizenship of Cyprus, Malta or Austria in the form of a 
supranational, complementary EU citizenship in addition to that of member 
states. Plural citizens are able to leverage benefits in multiple countries, at 
times against one another, extending options beyond the mere sum of all 
citizenships, to a transnational understanding of citizenship.134  
I  Global Market Citizenship  
Citizenship as property opens transnational, supranational or global 
perspectives through concepts such as global markets, as well as global 
justice and equality. 135  Traditional continuities of space, identity, 
citizenship and nationality, when facing globalisation and the need for 
increased individual mobility, are eroding or transforming.136 Where states 
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act as enterprises rather than public communities, they may fail to 
acknowledge public-and private spheres boundaries. 137  With emerging 
global market standardizations and harmonisations of citizenship, such as 
the need for residence waivers, it appears that states are, in effect, parting 
with sole power over the definition of the legal and political meaning of 
citizenship. Therefore, one of the main issues for states running CBI legal 
schemes may their relationship with the global market for citizenship and 
residence, in which these states also partake, as well as to that market’s 
stakeholders and industry.138 
Competition between CBI states and migrants as contracting parties for 
citizenship alone may pose a challenge to state sovereignty. Other actual or 
potential market stakeholders include a seemingly endless list of existing 
citizens and residents (CBI and non-CBI), CBI regions, all other, transitory 
and emerging (as well as non) CBI states, regions, and migrants non-
governmental organizations, national and transnational corporations. The 
global migration industry then is again comprised of governments of 
selling states, migrants, lawyers, immigration and relocation consultants, 
accountants, financial advisors, estate agents, builders and other 
stakeholders, advertising ‘citizenship for sale’ as a positive force for 
creating ‘global citizens’, here within the meaning of wealthy global 
travellers and passport collectors with a cosmopolitan lifestyle.139 Also, 
there are only very few legal service providers advising governments on 
formulating CBI law and policy, as well as assisting CBI migrants.  
These stakeholders may impact on policy or legal standards for CBI or 
all citizenship, blurring and transforming demarcations between the public 
and the private. As Kristin Surak states, this goes beyond ‘airlines checking 
passports or ‘security firms running detention centres’. 140  With CBI, 
citizenship as such has become subject to the ‘growing field of private 
actors shaping and implementing policy.’141  
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In order to remain competitive against the citizenship products of other 
CBI states, the CBI states are becoming increasingly bound by market rule, 
so as to not further extend any remaining residency periods or other 
restrictions to direct naturalization. The current global market for 
citizenship thus already transcends the social contract of a single citizen.142 
By way of the actual and continuous existence and operation of CBI, states 
create, necessitate and operate a global market for residence and citizenship 
from which a single state may perhaps no longer readily withdraw.143  
The ideal of the regulatory state has now given way to that of the 
competitive, efficient state under global market rule, constrained, even 
forced, to adopt particular policies, and removed from public scrutiny and 
accountability. Global market forces may render states, if not deregulated, 
powerless and disciplined by market logic.144  
Related to the presumption of market efficiency and neutrality is the 
idea that contracting parties ought to share relative equality in bargaining 
power. Such economic reasoning in citizenship sales is problematic, as 
mutual benefits cannot be guaranteed, especially where the guardian of any 
such guarantee, the state, is a contracting party.145  
Where CBI refers to privatised norm making and denationalised state 
agendas, it may lead to highly variable interpretations of state power within 
the global economy of citizenship, pleasing the market for citizenship 
rather than setting goals for social and economic well-being.146 
V  Universal Blueprints for New Genuine Links? Case Studies, 
Regulation and Reform  
In view of the above characterisations of CBI, it may be necessary to 
employ a universal rights approach beyond both state and market 
control.147 Also, price-based policies may not necessarily be very efficient 
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or successful for migration control.148 A more holistic outlook on CBI 
beyond a focus on price alone is therefore necessary. The CBI industry 
understands that nothing short of a ‘global outlook to market citizenship’ 
is required, which is to include those at the ‘lower’ end of market 
citizenship’s spectrum. 149  Ideas include voluntary donations, taxing 
multiple citizenships, conceptualizing a global tax for the rich, a global CBI 
fund from contributions of municipal CBI fees, and public policy reform 
to include philanthropic local and global goals in addition to national 
financial goals.150  
A  International and Supranational Migration Governance 
Frameworks for global, regional or international migration governance do 
not exist at this time. 151  The International Organization for Migration 
(‘IOM’) is currently limited in its role to that of a service provider advising 
governments and migrants.152 There are but a few binding treaties and 
offices that exist for specific issues, including the nearly universally 
ratified 1951 United Nations (‘UN’) Convention on the Status of Refugees 
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) or 
the International Labour Organization (‘ILO’).These are joined by soft law 
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approaches in the form of guiding principles and recommendations such as 
the UN General Assembly’s High Level Dialogue on Migration and 
Development, or the intergovernmental Berne Initiative,153 and with the 
International Agenda for Migration Management (‘IAMM’) or the United 
Nations led Global Commission on International Migration (‘GCIM’).154 
There are also calls for a World Migration Organization, which seem to 
favour bottom-up rather than top-down approaches to migration 
management, and include partnerships on bilateral and trans-regional 
levels.155   
B  Regional and Global Legal Practice Standards, Ethics, and 
Oversight Mechanisms 
CBI states are careful to protect their programs’ reputation. Applicants are 
screened for criminal backgrounds and their history of wealth acquisition, 
as otherwise third states may be less willing to accept CBI passports.156 
CBI may benefit from Regional Consultative Processes (‘RCP’) — that 
is to say, non-binding, informal and confidential discussion forums dealing 
with the objective of network-building to promote trust and support 
between participating states. 157  RCPs have contributed to global 
convergence in perceptions and expectations, which have in turn led to 
some harmonisation of policies and practice.158  
The global Investment Migration Council (‘IMC’) is currently 
operating to promote transparency, due diligence, training and academic 
research in the field. For this task, global practice standards, complaints 
procedures and ethics rules have emerged through the IMC Code of Ethics 
and Professional Conduct.159 This entity could further develop as a global 
forum, as well as an oversight and monitoring body. Such arole may be 
emerging, for instance, in regard to the IMC Transparency International 
                                                          
153  Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement presented to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights in 1998 (UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2/); also transregional level Free Trade 
Agreements and mobility partnerships; Kunz, Lavenex and Panizzon (eds), above n 152, 8–9. 
154  See Global Commission on International Migration, launched December 9, 2003 
<http://www.gcim.org>. Other initiatives include the Berne Initiative (leading in 2001 to the 
adoption of the International Agenda for Migration Management, IAMM) 
<https://www.iom.int/berne-initiative>; the inter-agency-based Global Migration Group 
(GMG) <http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org>, and the state-led yearly meetings of the 
Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) <https://gfmd.org/>. 
155  See further references in Corneloup, above n 151, 303–4. For T Alexander Aleinikoff, this is 
‘[s]ubstance without architecture’, a considerable codification of relevant rights, but no 
corresponding institutional structure: ‘International Legal Norms on Migration: Substance 
without Architecture’ in Ryszard Cholweinski, Richard Perruchoud and Euan MacDonald 
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Channac, 2006) 386. 
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Report on the Hungarian RBI programme. The report’s findings include 
strong indications that the programme does not contribute to the Hungarian 
economy but has instead been used for the private enrichment of politically 
influential individuals.160   
C  The Greater Good: Public Interest Criteria and New 
Zealand’s Discretionary Programme 
Most CBI programs ensure that the investment made contributes to local 
welfare, advancement and economic development. 161  Public Interest 
Criteria (‘PIC’) within naturalization laws refer to various aims of public 
policy. The public interest may range from the creation of revenue, and 
may also include global humanitarian causes, to which CBI proceeds can 
be assigned.  
It is within the power and control of states to not only legislate CBI 
programmes, but also, through PIC, to decide and adjust the extent of local 
and global humanitarian references within such legislation. Adding these 
references in turn appears to give the CBI states some capacity to create 
greater public acceptance of CBI schemes, by stressing the benefits of these 
programs in terms of, for example, improved national healthcare for the 
poor or global refugee assistance. Philanthropy in PIC references could be 
stand-alone goals or they could be added to CBI revenue creation. PIC thus 
enable states to respond to demands of an interconnecting, globalizing 
citizenship. 
Whereas in Austria’s program successful applicants must provide 
extraordinary scientific, artistic, cultural or economic benefits to the 
Republic of Austria, 162  New Zealand’s discretionary naturalization 
program allows the grant of more or less immediate citizenship to any 
person where it is ‘[i]n the public interest because of exceptional 
circumstances of a humanitarian or other nature relating to the 
applicant.’163 Residence requirements, as well as any intention to continue 
to reside after grant, may then be completely waived as the Minister thinks 
fit. 164  For example, Peter Thiel resided in New Zealand for 12 non-
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consecutive days in four separate trips and is said to have had no interest 
in continuing to reside in New Zealand due to his commitments 
elsewhere.165 Thiel’s NZ $1 Million donation to a philanthropic cause, the 
Christchurch earthquake relief fund, appears to have been a decisive 
element in the decision-making process within the overall equation of 
factors considered by government decisionmakers.166 Other elements seem 
to relate to Thiel’s actual and potential investments in New Zealand, as 
well as his entrepreneurial capacity to link New Zealand start-ups with 
Silicon Valley.167 To justify exceptional direct naturalization, the public 
interest may thus include a spectrum of interests between the local and the 
global, and between economic considerations and philanthropy.   
D  Malta’s CBI Program and References to ‘Humanity’ 
For Malta’s CBI Individual Investor Programme, an economic contribution 
is made to the country’s National Development and Social Fund.168 As to 
the factor of residence, things have been more complicated in Malta than 
they are in other CBI states. While the European Union Commission 
initially indicated that CBI, generally, should fall under state 
sovereignty,169 the EU Parliament later disapproved of the practice.170 Sale 
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of EU citizenship, as attached to the sale of national citizenship, was seen 
as incompatible with the EU obligations of member states to all other 
member states.171 On the example of Malta, the then EU Commission Vice 
President, Viviane Reding, stated that CBI programmes pose ‘[a]n entry 
door to the EU’ and that ‘[o]ne cannot put a price tag on [citizenship].’ In 
Reding’s view, Member states should only award citizenship to persons 
where there is a ‘[g]enuine link or genuine connection to the country in 
question’.172 This led Malta to introduce a one-year period of residence, 
replacing the zero-residence requirement in its CBI scheme.  
Interestingly, in Malta’s non-CBI but spousal naturalizations, contained 
in the same paragraph as the CBI scheme, immediate and direct 
naturalization without residence of the otherwise requisite period of five 
years is possible where there are ‘exceptional services’ rendered to Malta 
or to ‘humanity’173 In Malta’s CBI scheme, this link is currently missing. 
Here, CBI law applies to any person who may acquire citizenship by 
investment, albeit (now) with a minimum of one year of residence. It may 
then be asked whether a reference to humanity could be introduced also to 
the CBI part of this paragraph, and whether such exercise would be of 
benefit for developing a sustainable CBI. Arguably, since reference to 
services to Malta or to humanity are made for the naturalization of spouses 
of Maltese citizens, a similar reference could apply to CBI migrants, 
especially as these are complete strangers. Such systematic consistency 
would arguably assist to counter allegations of CBI as a “citizenship of 
convenience”.174  
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E  Proportionality for CBI Programmes? 
In the EU context, proportionality is a principle that guides government 
decisions, such as regarding the loss of citizenship. Could proportionality 
also apply generally to the acquisition of CBI?175 For instance, ongoing 
commitments between CBI states and migrants could be established. CBI 
migrants could be encouraged to more actively participate, to visit or reside 
in their country of choice, such as by being allowed to exercise more 
control and give input over the allocation and use of their own investments 
within the CBI state.176 In the European Court of Justice’s 2010 decision 
of Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern,177 the Court acknowledged that 
decisions as to the loss of citizenship, where these entail the loss of EU 
citizenship and thus deprive the person concerned of their rights and duties 
under that status, should be subject to a test of proportionality, especially 
in view of the duty of loyal or sincere cooperation between member states 
as contained in art 4(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (‘TEU’). 178 
While such a duty does not exist between all CBI states, there could be a 
regional approach to CBI that includes mutual cooperation, good practice 
standards, shared due diligence to enhance CBI’s sustainability and 
acceptance by other states and migrants.  
F  CBI’s Antagonists and Mirrors 
On one view, CBI not only undermines political participation, it also 
contradicts the recent national efforts to re-substantiate citizenship, such as 
through additional tests and integration requirements.179 The advent of CBI 
and global mobility are restricted by national instruments of political power 
and control, such as citizenship revocation provisions, 180  as well as 
artificial limitations on participation, placed especially on plural 
citizens.181 These re-nationalizations of the concept of citizenship by the 
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state are in addition to citizenship’s marketization and globalization- 
developments that today occur simultaneously.  
Mirages and mirror images of CBI include a ‘push from below’ in what 
Kamal Sadiq terms ‘documentary’ or ‘formal’ citizenship, existing for 
some ‘global others’, such as those without means or proper papers.182 
Some illegitimate migrants readily adopt the behaviours of citizens, over 
an often substantial period of ‘performative’ time and physical presence, 
gradually acquiring resident status and, with it, tokens of legitimacy in 
form of a paper trail that, in many cases, eventually leads to citizenship.183 
Where CBI could be seen as lawful non-presence (the attaining of passports 
without residence requirements), its mirror image, the paper citizen and 
actual denizen, here displays an initially illegitimate presence, which may 
(and if so, only gradually, in a process akin to naturalization, requiring time) 
become lawful presence.184 
In another example, the United Arab Emirates (‘UAE’) assigned 
foreign citizenship to control their local stateless population, the 
‘Bidoon’.185 In doing so, the UAE bulk-purchased citizenship from the 
Comores Islands, a small nation in the African East Coast. This was done 
in part as a response to the UN initiative to end statelessness.186 As a case 
of reverse CBI, the Bidoon, who have never set foot on the Comores, 
challenge citizenship’s national narrative, having become a transactional 
instrument for the nation state in an attempt to counter globalization in the 
form of statelessness.187  
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G  Revisiting the Social Contract: ‘Neo-Nottebohmian’ 
Genuine Links, and Proto-International and Supranational 
Citizenship 
When states sell citizenship they part with the underlying conventions of 
citizenship. CBI assists to overcome the randomness of birthplace and, to 
some extent, releases citizenship from the conceptual weight of the nation 
state. The practice of the current form of CBI, when seen as global market 
citizenship, questions the foundations and narratives of national citizenship, 
including the function of the state in fundamental rights protection and 
enforcement, as well as citizenship’s claim to act as a (national) ‘right to 
have rights’. 188  Market CBI’s possible challenges to state sovereignty, 
when impacting norm-making in this way, also includes a challenge to the 
state’s decision whether to sell citizenship. 189 While citizenship as a 
concept continues to exist as long as forms of membership make reference 
to the nation state, universal human rights could already function to limit 
the potentially erosive, self-eroding state practice of CBI. In view of the 
universal guarantee of human dignity, the nation State’s discretion, power 
and control in the area of the sale of citizenship cannot be unfettered or 
unlimited.190 A state centric view through which one, as citizen only, can 
access rights that apply to humans, is then increasingly being challenged.191  
Boundaries to the discretion of national governments are created, for 
instance, by the international legal prohibition of abuse of rights in art 15(2) 
UDHR, which limits the ability of states to arbitrarily revoke citizenship or 
deny the right to change citizenship.192 CBI as market citizenship is thus 
limited by the requirements and restrictions that apply to the concept of 
citizenship more generally. This in turn derives from the notion that it is 
not possible to attach market value to absolute or universal concepts such 
as human dignity.193  
Without CBI’s current references to global citizenship, it is not clear 
whether substantial payments in CBI alone could suffice in the search for 
more flexible reconceptualisations of citizenship, and become viewed as 
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establishing a genuine link to the nation, or even as a ‘genuine link to 
humanity’.194 In other words, a ‘neo-Nottebohmian’ genuine link through 
CBI, without residence, would be difficult to establish (even in times of 
globalization) when the ties established between the CBI citizen and state 
are defined by one-off payments alone. Where this is so, it may be 
necessary to allocate legal references as complementing concepts or 
substitutes for CBI monetary migration, such as by placing focus on 
references to the greater good, to humanity, global citizenship and to 
philanthropy, which some CBI programmes actually make. These 
references concerning national, regional or global humanitarian goals 
beyond markets could then act as substitutes for missing requirements of 
residence and political participation by CBI citizens in any given polity, 
and cater for CBI’s global commitments and aspirations, creating a genuine 
link for our times.  
Yasemin Soysal suggests replacing citizenship altogether with 
universal human rights, the protection of which is now the key to securing 
individual autonomy.195 In that context, CBI schemes’ references to global 
citizenship, while appearing to transcend national boundaries, are, in fact, 
at this time, still tied to the selling states, markets and individual rights 
protections.196  
As seen above, fair, equal and orderly transnational migration may 
require supranational migration governance, and may as such require a 
global reframing and reconceptualisation of citizenship that includes CBI 
phenomena. This may be necessary to avoid fragmentations of citizenship, 
and to integrate CBI as a novel form of citizenship into umbrella concepts 
such as the ‘global social contract’ (‘GSC’).197 The GSC, viewed through 
the lens of CBI, may refer to the idea of linking the social contract (and 
also citizenship) to notions including global membership or global justice. 
States could, for instance, decide to release their otherwise price-bound 
citizenship or residence entitlements for free to those who are deserving, 
such as to those serving the nation or humanity.198 
While CBI schemes appear to contradict the national social contract, 
they may be merely implementing an existing commercial reality within an 
already highly mobile and globalised world. 199  Citizenship’s historical 
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social contract involved an exchange of rights and two core duties, 
allegiance and military duty, as evidence of loyalty.200 Today, the citizen is 
primarily seen as a rights bearer, capable of claiming rights, with very few 
remaining core duties, including paying taxes and obeying laws.201 There 
does not seem to exist any contemporary requirement to reside.202  
CBI is currently challenged for leaving questions of integration and 
communal spirit unanswered.203 This may be the price that CBI is to pay 
for utilizing the terminology of citizenship, leaving a gap that is currently 
filled by CBI’s narrative of global citizenship to create coherence within 
its use of that terminology.204  
Absent periods of personal, physical presence, and given its emphasis 
on mobile travellers holding plural citizenship, CBI may then be seen as 
de-territorial, ‘global citizenship.’ 205  CBI states do appear to create 
economic schemes in response to migrant claims to a right of mobility, 
which, in turn, perhaps finds expression in the right to leave any country in 
art 13(2) of the UDHR.206 This right knows no corresponding ‘right to 
enter’, yet the possibility to outright purchase citizenship without residence 
requirements could assist in the formulation of such a free movement right.  
A ‘global citizenship’ is not understood as an institutional legal status, 
as there is no organisation with global legal authority. Instead, global 
citizenship may here refer to the individual status of a person as a citizen 
of multiple countries, or worldwide, with time spent in a single nation state 
mattering no more than time spent in any other nation state, releasing the 
concept of citizenship from its connections to territory and territorial time. 
For Peter Furia, the question for global citizenship emerges in view of 
rights distribution in an unequal world.207 The concept of citizenship, like 
that of a person, can then apply independently of any institutional 
arrangement under which it could be recognised.208 However thin CBI may 
be, it is still bound by Human Rights standards. Understood in this way, a 
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global citizenship driven by global citizen travellers under a necessarily 
incomplete global social contract goes beyond CBI mobility, and includes 
fundamental rights protections and obligations with reference to humanity 
and personhood. 209  A rights and obligations dimension could then be 
applied to both states and citizens, and owed to the international 
community as a whole,210 addressing individual persons as the ultimate 
subjects in international law.211  
It is yet not clear how many CBI migrants see themselves as world 
citizens, or whether they have confidence in the role of the United Nations. 
Research that actually links CBI’s claim to global citizenship and CBI 
migrants is currently missing.212 However, for the many individuals who 
do identify themselves as global citizens under an imagined global social 
contract that is evidenced by very real, fundamental and universal Human 
Rights protections, the political community of a global citizenship is more 
than mere imagination.213  
VI  Discussion 
Applying market logic, a completely transactional and functional (‘thin’) 
citizenship may come in form of temporary citizenship as a type of 
enhanced residence entitlement. For instance, Antigua now issues its CBI-
migrants with an initial passport valid for five years — a ‘temporary 
passport’ — which is the amount of time often required to apply for and 
gain citizenship elsewhere.214 
States may have legal authority to engage in the act of selling 
citizenship. 215  It is not clear, however, whether states are morally and 
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legally permitted to undermine state sovereignty by allowing global market 
logic to limit that states’ own ability to govern citizenship. As guardians of 
citizenship, and under the Human Rights umbrella, states are required to 
ameliorate the economic and social inequalities resulting from unregulated 
operations of citizenship markets. 216  No sensible conception of global 
citizenship, including global market citizenship (even where infused with 
Human Rights logic), is possible without the concept of state sovereignty 
as intermediary.  
Derek Heater warns that globalisation ‘undermines the autonomy of the 
person, which lies at the heart of the citizenry concept.’217 Fast-tracked CBI 
schemes thus expose the countries that run them, and also, directly, 
individual migrants, to macro-economic volatilities and to the erosion of 
the rules of membership caused when citizenship law and policy are linked 
to global markets.218 Irene Langran argues that ‘[s]tates are constrained in 
the economic realm by the need to adopt certain pro-globalization, neo-
liberal policies under pressure from international organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) and the World Bank.’219 The IMF is 
cautioning CBI states to pay back public sovereign debts, and warns of an 
over-reliance on CBI revenue, since CBI inflows could stop at any time. 
The IMF suggests a regional approach to CBI programs, which may 
strengthen integrity whilst reducing costs.220  
CBI governments may face the dilemma of a lack of choice when 
adopting economic citizenship policies.221 This may be the case for CBI 
schemes, especially where utilised not from a position of power and control 
of the selling state, but from a position of economic logic or need, as an 
emergency measure implemented to create revenue to save a failing 
economy. For instance, in Cyprus, CBI was offered in 2013 to affluent 
foreign investors as a compensation deal for their Cypriot bank account 
deposit losses at times of financial crisis.222 CBI may also work as an 
economic response to natural disasters.223 The recent Hurricane season of 
2017 (the storms ‘Irma’ and ‘Maria’) lead directly to emergency sales of 
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citizenship.224 The issue of generating emergency funds at dramatically 
discounted prices (reductions of USD50 000 to 200 000) is a potential race 
to the bottom in standards of due diligence and monitoring requirements 
applied to applicants in an effort to immediately pay for hurricane-relief 
efforts. In other words, this could make authorities more inclined to 
approve would-be citizens and result in laxer vetting practices and 
potentially less time spent and funds expended in investigating each 
migrant’s case.  
An example could be the twin island state of Antigua and Barbuda in 
the Caribbean. Due to the vast devastation of Barbuda in the storm season 
of 2017, the commercial attractiveness of CBI was somewhat impacted. 
The price of CBI had been halved to remain competitive, and much of the 
revenue created was spent rebuilding Barbuda. This example may 
demonstrate the more than potential impact that market demand and 
economic needs might have on the laws and policies of a state. In other 
words, from a strictly commercially view only, to sell its own citizenship, 
a secession from Barbuda could have made sense for Antigua. Dominica, 
on the other hand, has not lowered the price of citizenship, as, in 
comparison to other selling nations, Dominica’s (as well as St Lucia’s) 
citizenship sales were already set at a comparably low cost (of around 
USD100 000). 
CBI are thus predominantly mercantile phenomena.225 When entering 
into contracts, all rights and obligations and other essential details such as 
price are finite, to be made known at the time of contracting. Otherwise, 
CBI contracts would not meet the requirement of contractual certainty. 
Global market citizens pay to enjoy liberties and to hold no further 
allegiances. 226  CBI thus refers to the right to mobility for payment, 
expressed in the direct, obligation-free purchase of passports at the time of 
contract.227  
As a form of global citizenship, CBI would face the impossible 
challenge of reconciling both universality and diversity.228 CBI’s claims to 
universality, the relations between citizenship and the universal application 
of Human Rights, as well as CBI’s inherently municipal nature, cannot be 
placed within a common legal structure. 229  April Carter states that a 
conflict of ideas is commonly associated with globalism, namely the neo-
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liberal free-trade agenda and the commitment to universal human rights. 
Immanuel Kant, writing in an age of colonisation, ‘explored how a 
cosmopolitan desire to travel the world could lead to the danger of 
exploitation.’ 230  This conflict reappears now within CBI’s global 
ambiguities: CBI combines the elements of global free trade with a ‘flag of 
convenience’ citizenship, fixing citizenship’s price in a combination with 
market demand, and not by states alone. Is CBI nothing more (and nothing 
less) thanmarket membership “enriched” with seemingly random, and at 
any stage merely voluntary references to “philanthropy”?231 While CBI 
market schemes claim to exist in the public interest, generating revenue for 
the public good and, to some extent, for the general ‘global’ welfare,232 
given the discretionary nature of most programs there are no safeguards for 
such claims. CBI states seek large, one-off contributions, not as payments 
of upfront loyalty and in reference to their role as welfare states, but in their 
function as competitive states. 
While citizenship’s legitimacy today is seen as still depending on social 
cohesion and political participation,233 as seen in the existence of the very 
practice of CBI, citizenship itself does not necessarily provide a guarantee 
of the proper and loyal fulfilment of sovereign functions.234 However, CBI  
makes another promise and claim towards a global citizenship of individual 
rights.235  
In practice, CBI as a form of ‘global market’ citizenship allows legal 
pluralities and ambiguous overlaps of market and state legal powers, with 
many citizens holding plural citizenship status that allows them to exist 
somewhat within, as well as outside, a single state’s control.236 This is 
because the legal system of CBI, once unleashed, may directly impact on 
traditional conceptions of citizenship as well as on the diplomatic and 
economic relations of all nations.237 CBI’s ripple effects may force states 
to internationalise, and with eroding sovereignty, perhaps globalize, the law 
of citizenship. CBI renders states unable to implement naturalization 
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policies without considering the laws and policies of other states, as well 
as the quasi-normative powers of the global market for citizenship and 
residence entitlements, and, in addition, rely on international organisations 
as buffers, brokers and overseers of fundamental rights, reducing global 
disparities.238  
For example, the reality of a plural citizenship as an emerging global 
standard is a promise also contained within market CBI. CBI facilitating 
plurality in citizenship may then also assist in overcoming some of the 
inequalities of naturalization and political assimilation of greater number 
of immigrants.239 In this way, CBI as citizenship based on market value 
may achieve widespread acceptance.240 At the same time, however, CBI, 
in its predominant focus on markets, may merely create further inequalities 
in membership on a global market sphere. 
CBI’s deconstruction of citizenship, through the combination of 
references to states, markets and the global social contract, could introduce 
a ‘bottom up’ approach to new meanings of global membership that place 
focus on the supranational, fundamentally protected status given to the 
individual by all states, placing the individual both within and yet outside 
the international community of states, as well as within and outside markets. 
CBI could be seen to currently exist complementary to national citizenship. 
This assumption means that CBI would, at least in part, exists somewhat in 
reference to factors vested outside the nation state. This in turn may mean 
that, beyond reference to global markets for membership entitlements, 
there is now a potential (and perhaps the necessity) to re-conceptualize 
citizenship in reference to an individual, personal status of global 
membership, more strongly tied to and vested within fundamental, 
universal human rights law.241  
Without offering further reference points beyond markets and with 
states now directly operating on those markets, CBI is a complex 
phenomenon and seems paradoxical: CBI appears to challenge the concept 
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of statehood, as states now sell citizenship as one of the essential elements 
of statehood.242 This leaves the concept of citizenship currently situated 
somewhere between commerce, a claim to philanthropy and a mere 
aspiration to somehow becoming global citizenship.243 It is thus time to 
further explore and conceptualise CBI in ways that safeguard CBI’s claims 
to function inclusively, in reference to all citizens as members of 
humanity.244 If CBI becomes a global practice, it should include the ‘global 
other’ such as those seeking refuge. Without reconceptualising the genuine 
links of citizenship, CBI, relying predominantly on economic and market 
reasoning, is an incomplete legal concept, requiring further research.245 
Insofar as this article makes a case for CBI functioning as a transnational 
or supranational concept of citizenship in times of globalization, I conclude 
by emphasizing that this is a preliminary case. The immediate relevance of 
CBI then is to act as a placeholder for a conversation about the direction of 
the public law of citizenship, residence and naturalization.  
VII  Conclusion 
This article has introduced and critiqued CBI legal mechanisms. It has 
argued that CBI laws are complex and powerful agents of change. CBI 
programmes should therefore no longer be understood as legal isolates, but 
as potential blueprints in the evolution of public law. By selling citizenship, 
states are ceding control over citizenship to markets. CBI claims to act as 
global citizenship. However, as economic citizenship alone, allowing for 
market control, CBI transforms citizenship as an element of statehood and 
challenges statist interpretations of citizenship as vested within the sole 
power and control of the nation state.  With a view to law reform, this 
article has suggested re-introducing ‘neo-Nottebohmian’ genuine links for 
a more sustainable CBI, incorporating, amongst other factors, reference to 
fundamental rights within the laws of market citizenship. This is to allow 
CBI to act as an interface beyond citizens, states and markets. CBI may 
then act as a window to forthcoming legal transformations in public law, 
                                                          
242   For the elements of statehood, see the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, opened 
for signature 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934). 
243  The paradox of CBI is that, at the same time of making a claim to global citizenship, CBI 
needs to rely on citizenship’s municipal, national institutional legal framework as well as on 
the international forum in terms of their acceptance. 
244  A fundamental rights approach to citizenship as a concept for general membership of humanity 
may provide checks and balances from both market as well as state power, protecting 
autonomous spheres of ‘citizens’ as individuals no longer exclusively ascribed as subjects to 
particular policies. 
245  The question whether an economic reasoning of citizenship is sufficient for a sustainable 
future and direction of citizenship, especially in view of CBI’s claim to global citizenship, 
remains. Some see citizenship generally as an incomplete concept as well. For instance, Saskia 
Sassen, above n 1, 277–8, applies Cass Sunstein’s theory of incompletely theorized 
agreements to a form of flexible citizenship as an incomplete agreement or contract between 
the state and its subjects. This incompleteness allows for the state to accommodate and 
respond to changed conditions without sacrificing the formal status of citizenship: Cass R 
Sunstein, ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreements Commentary’ (1994-1995) 108 Harvard Law 
Review 1733, 1746; Cass R Sunstein, ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional 
Law’ (Working Paper No 147, University of Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory, 2007).  
 
 
and may, initially through marketisation, become a potential forerunner for 
an international or, complementing national citizenship, supranational law 
of citizenship. 
 
